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Abstract As part of the Center for Financial Security’s
2010 symposium, this study examined the association
between consumer debt and divorce. Longitudinal data
from the National Survey of Families and Households
(N = 4,574 couples) indicated that consumer debt was
positively associated with divorce. Financial conflict
completely mediated this association for both husbands and
wives and marital satisfaction also completely mediated the
association for wives. These findings suggest that when
families take financial steps to secure their financial stability they may also be taking steps to secure their relationship stability.
Keywords Consumer debt  Divorce  Gender  Marital
conflict  Marital satisfaction

Although politicians and political commentators frequently
discuss the size of the total U.S. federal debt (over $14
Trillion as of August 2011), American individuals and
families also contract and carry high levels of debt. In June
2011, the total outstanding consumer credit owed by
American households topped 2.4 trillion dollars (U.S.
Federal Reserve 2011). Around one-third of the total (800
billion dollars) is revolving credit such as credit card debt
(U.S. Federal Reserve 2011), which averages out to be
about $15,900 per person among those who have outstanding credit card debt (Author calculation; Woolsey and
Schulz 2010).
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Consumer debt can be particularly problematic for
consumers. Consumer debt typically has interest rates that
are two to five times higher than other debt types (Peterson
2003). Consumer credit is often revolving, meaning that
consumers can continue to borrow on the credit line at least
until they reach a limit. Although this makes consumer
credit extremely convenient, it can also quickly lead to
large, high-interest balances. And unlike other types of
debt, such as mortgage debt or automobile loans, consumer
debt typically has no asset associated with it.
Financial educators and counselors rightly inform their
clients of the financial problems of carrying high levels of
consumer debt, but family relationship difficulties are also
associated with carrying high levels of consumer debt
(Dew 2007; Conger et al. 1993). For example consumer
debt is both indirectly and directly associated with higher
levels of marital conflict (Dew 2007; Conger et al. 1993).
Another study found that newlywed couples who assumed
consumer debt became less happy in their marriage
whereas those who paid down consumer debt became
happier or had only minor declines in satisfaction (Dew
2008). A qualitative study of couples in ‘‘great marriages,’’
most of whom were in long-term marriages, also suggested
that these couples avoided debt (Skogrand et al. 2010).
Although consumer debt is problematic for couples’
marital quality, it is unknown whether this translates into
lower marital stability. That is, few studies have examined
the association between consumer debt and divorce. Consequently, this study utilized the National Survey of
Families and Households (NSFH) to test whether consumer
debt predicts divorce. It also examined potential mediators
of this association. The NSFH was the best choice for this
study because it was the only nationally representative,
longitudinal data survey to include questions about consumer debt, relationship quality, and divorce.
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Financial Issues, Marital Quality, and Divorce
Financial Issues and Divorce
Because researchers only began earnestly studying the
association between normative financial issues, such as
assets and debt, and relationships in the early 1990s, it is
perhaps unsurprising that very few studies have examined
whether these issues are linked to divorce. A few studies
have shown an association between financial issues, negative marital quality, and divorce. Specifically, perceptions
of spouses’ money handling can be problematic in marriage. For example, perceptions of one’s spouse overspending are strongly associated with negative marital
quality (Britt et al. 2008). Further when individuals with
different orientations toward money are married—e.g., a
‘‘spendthrift’’ married to a ‘‘tightwad’’—they have higher
conflict levels and lower marital happiness (Rick et al.
2009). Materialism has also been found to be negatively
associated with marital satisfaction (Dean et al. 2007).
Given all of these findings it is unsurprising that perceiving
that one’s spouse spends money foolishly was the third
strongest predictor of divorce—behind only infidelity and
alcohol/drug abuse (Amato and Rogers 1997). Taken
together these studies suggest that consumer debt would be
associated with poorer marital quality and consequently a
higher likelihood of divorce.
Research has also shown that financial assets are negatively associated with divorce. The more assets couples
had, the less likely they were to divorce (Dew 2009). This
relationship did attenuate over time, but it never became
non-significant. Two mechanisms fully mediated the
association between assets and divorce and these mechanisms worked through the wives’ characteristics. First,
assets were positively related to wives’ marital satisfaction
which was negatively associated with divorce. In other
words, the more assets wives had, the happier they were on
average, and the less likely they were to divorce. Second,
assets were positively associated with wives’ perception
that their standard of living would be lower following a
divorce which was also was associated with a lower likelihood of divorce. In other words, assets raised wives’
perceptions about the costs and economic consequences of
divorce and these perceptions were in turn associated with
a lower propensity to divorce. Further, to the extent that
consumer debt has opposite consequences of financial
assets, consumer debt might be positively associated with
the likelihood of divorce.
Only two studies directly test this hypothesis (only one
of them occurred in the U.S.), but neither of them support
this hypothesis. Logistic regressions using longitudinal
data failed to find an association between consumer debt
and divorce in Korean data (Chang and Lee 2006). In data
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that was nationally representative of the U.S., Sanchez and
Gager (2000) included assets and consumer debt as divorce
predictors, but they were not significant. This study is not
conclusive, however, because of some of the analytic
decisions made. Sanchez and Gager’s (2000) only included
individuals under 40 years, and only those in their first
marriage in spite of the fact that participants over 40 years
and those who are in higher-order marriages are at risk of
divorce as well. Further, Sanchez and Gager utilized a
discrete-time analysis with years until the divorce (0–5) as
the unit of analysis even though the NSFH data is detailed
enough for months to be used in a continuous survival-time
analysis. These analytic decisions may have limited the
ability for financial issues to predict divorce. Other studies
that have asserted that financial issues are unrelated to
divorce do not actually test the proposition (Andersen
2005; Dean et al. 2007). Consequently, this study adds a
more fine-grained, externally-valid analysis of the relationship between consumer debt and divorce. Further, this
study tests a theoretically-derived mediation framework for
this analysis.
Consumer Debt and Marital Satisfaction
Beyond examining whether consumer debt is associated
with divorce, this study sought to explain any association
between the two phenomena. Marital satisfaction might
link consumer debt and divorce. Specifically, the process of
social exchange may enable marital satisfaction to mediate
this association.
Social exchange theory explains union formation and
dissolution. It suggests that individuals compare the benefits and costs of their current relationship with the
expectations they have for the relationship (Nye 1982;
Thibault and Kelley 1959). When the benefit-to-cost
analysis meets or exceeds expectations individuals remain
happy in their relationship. When individuals are happy,
they stay in their relationship. However, when individuals
feel that their benefits and costs are below what they expect
they become dissatisfied and begin examining their relationship alternatives. Finally, if individuals perceive that
the benefits of alternative situations outweigh the costs of
leaving the relationship, they will dissolve the union. Thus,
if consumer debt makes it more difficult for couples to
meet their relationship expectations, they will become
dissatisfied and be at a greater risk of ending their
marriage.
Only one study has directly linked consumer debt and
marital satisfaction. In this study, newlywed couples’
changes in consumer debt level were negatively associated
with changes in their martial satisfaction (Dew 2008).
Those couples who paid off their debt experienced
increases in their marital satisfaction or only slight
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satisfaction declines whereas those who assumed debt
experienced relatively large marital satisfaction declines.
This was particularly the case for couples who began their
marriage with no consumer debt but then assumed large
quantities of debt. Further, this study found that consumer
debt inhibited newlywed’s ability to meet their relationship
expectations, such as spending time together.
Perceptions of overspending are also associated with
divorce and lower levels of marital satisfaction. As noted
above, perceptions that one’s spouse spends money foolishly was the third strongest predictor of divorce in a
national study (Amato and Rogers 1997). Further, perceptions of a spouse’s overspending were linked to lower
marital satisfaction even though perceptions of one’s own
overspending or perceptions of joint-overspending were
unrelated to marital satisfaction (Britt et al. 2008). Thus, it
may not be overspending per se that is the problem, but the
perception that is one’s spouse that is overspending or
foolishly handling money. To the extent that consumer debt
represents one’s spouse over spending or handling money
foolishly, this might suggest a path leading from higher
consumer debt to lower marital satisfaction to higher levels
of divorce. Unfortunately, the NSFH did not include
measures of perceptions of spousal overspending. Further,
consumer debt is reported on the couple level. Consequently, consumer debt levels may serve only as a crude
proxy of overspending or spending money foolishly.
Financial satisfaction has also been associated with
higher marital quality. For example, in one study, the more
financial satisfaction individuals had the less likely they
were to consider divorce (Grable et al. 2007). Indeed, this
study showed that 90% of those with high levels of
financial satisfaction had never considered divorce and
none of these highly satisfied individuals had frequently
considered divorce. By way of contrast, 10% of the participants who had moderate and low levels of financial
satisfaction frequently considered divorce and only 67%
had never considered divorce. Given that consumer debt is
negatively associated with financial satisfaction and positively associated with economic pressure (Dew 2007;
Conger et al. 1993), I hypothesize that marital satisfaction
mediates the association between consumer debt and the
likelihood of divorce.

Consumer Debt and Conflict
An alternative reason that consumer debt might positively
predict divorce is because it predicts conflict. In the context
of social exchange, marital conflict is a strong cost to the
relationship. No one expects to have conflicts with their
spouse. Indeed, contemporary marriage norms encourage
expectations of high levels of emotional intimacy and
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partnership (Coontz 2005; Whitehead and Popenoe 2001),
something inherently incompatible with marital conflict.
Consumer debt is related to marital conflict. Consumer
debt directly predicted increases in marital disagreements
over time, even after accounting for other financial problems (Dew 2007). This finding is noteworthy because
financial conflict was not part of the dependent variable.
Rather only conflict about other common marital problems
like spending time together and the division of housework
was analyzed. Thus, consumer debt was related to generalized marital conflict or to conflict that goes beyond
fighting about money. In the current study I directly
examined consumer debt’s association with financial disagreements because financial disagreements powerfully
influence marital processes (Dew and Dakin 2011). I
hypothesize that financial disagreements mediate the
association between consumer debt and divorce.
Consumer Debt and Perceived Financial Unfairness
Instead of being linked through marital satisfaction or
conflict, consumer debt might be positively linked to
divorce if it is associated with perceptions of financial
unfairness. Relationship fairness or equity is one of the
strongest expectations contemporary couples have (Coontz
2005; McGoldrick 1999; Thompson 1991). Somewhat
analogous to social exchange theory is distributive justice
theory which states that if individuals feel that their relationship is unfair to themselves, they will either modify it
or end it (Major 1987).
Consumer debt may positively relate to perceptions of
financial unfairness. Happy couples make financial decisions jointly (Schaninger and Buss 1986; Skogrand et al.
2010). Britt et al.’s (2008) findings also support this possibility. Although they found that when the participants
perceived that their spouse overspent they were less happy,
their item measuring overspending was somewhat more
complex. The item stated, ‘‘Your partner spends large
amounts of money without first consulting with you’’
(p. 37). This item confounded overspending with financial
decision making power. Consequently, overspending may
be most problematic to marriage when it arouses feelings
of unfairness. When financial decision making power is not
shared, spouses are less happy and their marriages are more
likely to end (Schaninger and Buss 1986). Thus, I
hypothesize that perceptions of financial unfairness to
oneself will mediate the association between consumer
debt and divorce.
Consumer Debt and Gender
Financial issues within the family are gender issues
(Kenney 2006; Zelizer 1994), although researchers have
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not always cast them in this light. Whereas some issues,
like feelings of economic pressure and perceptions of
spouses’ overspending, are associated with marital processes in the same way for men and women (Amato and
Rogers 1997; Conger et al. 1999), other issues vary by
gender. For example, the association between assets and
divorce worked only through wives’ characteristics (Dew
2009). Further, wives and husbands perceive their finances
differently. In one study, wives tended to overstate their
true debt levels whereas husbands tended to overstate their
true asset levels (Zagorsky 2003).
Like assets, consumer debt is probably associated with
divorce through wives’ characteristics. If wives expect
financial security in their marriage—and many still do
(Smock et al. 2005)—consumer debt might represent a
failed expectation and decrease marital satisfaction. Too
much debt in the relationship may lead wives to realize that
they lack financial stability.
Alternatively, wives might be more sensitive to financial
unfairness. Husbands have historically controlled money
within the home (Zelizer 1994). Research suggests that
husbands still have more financial decision making power
than their wives and they are less financially accountable to
their wives than vice versa (Kenney 2006; Pahl 1995). For
example, a qualitative study showed that husbands will
shift unpleasant financial tasks to their wives like managing
household bills and debt when financial stability declines
(Thorne 2010). Whatever the mechanism, I hypothesize
that consumer debt will be linked to divorce through wives’
characteristics more than husbands’ characteristics.

Method
Data and Sample
I used data from the first and second waves of the NSFH in
this study. The first wave of the NSFH (W1) occurred in
1987 and 1988. The survey was based on a household
sampling strategy using a stratified random sample and
random-digit dialing (Sweet et al. 1988). During W1,
researchers interviewed individuals from over 13,000
households; over 5,000 married couples participated. The
second wave (W2) took place between 1992 and 1994.
During W2, researchers interviewed over 10,000 of the
original households. The inclusion criteria for the current
study were broad to enhance external validity. Specifically,
participants had to be married at W1, participate in W2 of
the NSFH, and have their spouse participate in the NSFH.1
1

Age, though used in other studies, was not a selection criterion for
this study. Consequently, this study has a large age range of
participants. To ensure that the findings were robust with respect to
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The participants also had to have a valid number of months
either between W1 and their divorce date or between W1
and W2 if they did not divorce. These criteria yielded a
sample of 4,574 couples.
Nearly 900 couples were in W1 of the NSFH, but did
not participate in W2 of the NSFH. Because 5 years separated W1 and W2 of the NSFH, this represents about a 3%
per year attrition rate. I compared those who left with those
who stayed in the sample (logistic regression not shown).
Assets, consumer debt, and education negatively predicted
attrition whereas being married longer, being older, or
being a member of a race/ethnic minority group positively
predicted attrition. There were no differences in marital
quality between those who stayed in the sample and those
who left. That is, marital satisfaction and conflict levels did
not predict attrition. Losing individuals from race and
ethnic minority groups certainly made the findings less
representative. Losing a greater number of participants who
had lower amounts of consumer debt might have also
artificially inflated the association between consumer debt
and divorce.
Descriptive statistics give an idea of the average characteristics of the participants at W1 of the NSFH (Table 1).
On average, both wives and husbands were happy in their
marriage, did not perceive much financial unfairness, and
fought about finances less than once per month. The
average age for wives was about 40 and was about 43 for
husbands. Most participants were in their first marriage and
had completed high school or some college. About 10% of
the sample was African-American and 7% were of another
race or ethnic minority group. The median asset level was
around $60,000 (about $119,000 in 2011 dollars). Median
consumer debt was $178 (about $350 after adjusting for
inflation). The average marital duration was 192 months,
or about 16 years.
Measures
Dependent Variable
I used proportional hazards models to test the predictors of
divorce. Consequently, the actual dependent variable is the
hazard of divorce—or the likelihood of divorce occurring
at any given month of the survey. To construct the hazard
of divorce, I needed to specify the number of months that
participants remained at risk of divorce. For those who did
not divorce, this was simply the number of months between
W1 and W2 of the NSFH. For those who divorced, this was
Footnote 1 continued
age, I conducted the analyses after dropping anyone over age 61 (e.g.,
retirement age) and anyone under the age of 21. The findings were
unchanged (not shown).

123

558

J Fam Econ Iss (2011) 32:554–565

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (N = 4,575 couples)
Wives

Husbands

M

StD

Range

M

StD

Range

W1 Marital satisfaction

6.05

1.26

1–7

6.11

1.19

1–7

W1 Perceived financial unfairness

.12

.38

0–2

.09

.33

0–2

Individual variables

W1 Frequency of financial conflict

1.79

.75

1–6

1.84

.79

1–6

W1 Age

40.43

14.31

16–97

43.02

14.76

19–89

W1 Number of marriages

1.25

.52

1–6

1.27

.56

1–5

W1 Education

12.76

2.63

0–20

12.85

3.13

0–20

Black

.10

.29

0–1

.10

.30

0–1

Other race/ethnicity

.07

.25

0–1

.07

.25

0–1

M

StD

Range

Couple variables
W1 Assetsa

$27,000

$115,676.66

$0–$4,265,000

W1 Consumer debta

$178

$3,468

$0–$97,500

W1 Incomea

$31,500

$43,741.77

0–$982,000

W1 Marital duration (in months)

191.91

170.93

0–751

Wives

Husbands

M

StD

Range

M

StD

Range

Divorce between W1 and W2

.11

.32

0–1

.11

.32

0–1

W1 Age for those who divorce

31.32

8.80

16–77

34.33

9.51

19–70

Divorce statistics

a

Sample median

the number of months between W1 and the month of the
divorce.
In the proportional hazards models almost all of the
cases were left truncated. That is, the most of the participants had already been at risk of divorce prior to entering
observation because most of them married before the start
of the NSFH. Thus, to accurately model this fact, I adjusted
the proportional hazards for the duration of participants’
marriage at W1 of the NSFH (Allison 2010).
Independent Variables
The main independent variables were three measures of
participants’ W1 financial wellbeing. To create the W1
consumer debt measure, I summed participants’ amount of
outstanding credit card debt, installment loans (excluding
automobile loans2), and past due bills (e.g., unsecured debt
types). To create the W1 asset measure, I summed the

savings, investments, and home equity value that participants reported. Home equity was the value of the home as
reported by the participant minus the amount still owed on
the home.3 Finally, the total W1 household income as
reported by participants measured income. I transformed
these three variables by adding 1 and then taking log base
10 transformation to normalize them and bring them into
line with the assumptions of the different analyses.
The first mediator was W1 marital satisfaction. Marital
satisfaction was an item that asked participants, ‘‘Taking
things all together, how would you describe your marriage’’. Participants could respond from 1 (Very Unhappy)
to 7 (Very Happy). A multi-item marital satisfaction scale
would have been a more reliable instrument. Unfortunately, W1 of the NSHF did not contain such a scale and all
of the independent variables needed to come from W1 to
maintain correct temporal ordering. When sample sizes are
large enough, global marital satisfaction items perform
about the same as multi-time scales (Johnson 1993).

2

This study did not use automobile loans because they have both an
asset and a liability component and are typically secured loans.
Further, the loan amount is not revolving, the interest rates are fixed
and are much lower than interest rates on typical consumer debt.
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3

Less than 1.5% of the participants had negative equity. Because it is
impossible to take the log of a negative number, I set these values
equal to 0.
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The frequency of financial disagreements at W1 was the
second mediator variable. This variable asked participant,
‘‘How often, if at all, in the last year have you had open
disagreements about money?’’ Participants responded from
1 (Never) to 6 (Almost Every Day).
The last mediator variable was W1 financial unfairness.
This variable was part of a series of four items that asked
participants how fair their perceived different aspects of
their relationship. The item specifically asked, ‘‘How do
you feel about the fairness in your relationship in spending
money.’’ The response set ranged from 1 (Very Unfair to
Me) to 5 (Very Unfair to My Partner). I reverse coded the
variable because unfairness to the participant was hypothesized to be the mediator. Then, because a score of 1 to 3
represented no unfairness to the participant, I subtracted
three from the scale and set any unfairness to ones partner
as equal to 0. The result was an item scale ranging from 0
to 2 that represented how much unfairness to oneself the
participant perceived regarding spending money.
I also included six control covariates that were measured
at W1: age, number of marriages, education, two categorical variables that measured race/ethnicity (White, NonHispanic was the omitted category), and a variable that
measured the number of children in the home. With the
exception of the financial variables all of the other variables were reported separately by both wives and husbands.
Although some of the variables had no missing
responses, others had missing responses. Up to 15% of the
responses were missing among the variables. Rather than
listwise delete cases, I used multiple imputation. Multiple
imputation generates five plausible responses in place of
the missing responses. The analyses are then run five times
and the results are synthesized. Multiple imputation produces coefficients and standard errors that more statistically sound than mean imputation or list-wise deletion
(Rubin 1987).
Analysis
This study tested the association between consumer debt
and the hazard of divorce, and possible mediators of this
relationship. The first step to testing a mediation model was
to examine whether consumer debt predicted the purported
mediator variables (Baron and Kenney 1986). If consumer
debt did not predict a variable then it could not be a
mediator. Consequently, I first regressed the three mediator
variables—marital satisfaction, financial disagreements,
and financial unfairness onto consumer debt using ordinary
least squares regression. These models also included assets,
income, and the control covariates.
The next step of establishing the mediation model was
to examine whether consumer debt was associated with the
hazard of divorce. To accomplish this, I used proportional
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hazards models (Cox Regressions). Proportional hazards
models assume an underlying continuous-time distribution
and assess whether covariates raise or lower the hazard or
likelihood of an event during each period of time that a
participant remains at risk of the event. For this study, the
event of interest was divorce. Every month that the participants were married they were at risk of divorce. Thus,
the analyses examined whether consumer debt and the
other covariates were associated with a higher or lower
hazard of divorce during each month.
One of the main assumptions of proportional hazards
models is that the effect of the independent variables does
not change over time. I tested this assumption by multiplying each of the independent variables by the log of the
number of months at risk and adding this interaction term
to the analysis (Allison 2010). Only one of the interaction
terms was significant. This indicates that the models meet
the assumptions of proportionality for the most part. I
address the one significant interaction (husband’s marital
satisfaction by time) in the results section.
In the final step, I added the mediator variables. To fully
establish the mediation model, the association between
consumer debt and divorce needed to drop to zero when the
mediator variables were in the model (Baron and Kenney
1986). Further, the mediator variables had to be associated
with the hazard of divorce. In addition to meeting these two
qualifications, I also used post-hoc Sobel tests to make sure
that the associations between the consumer debt, the
mediator variables, and divorce were strong enough for a
mediator model to be plausible.
Previous research has indicated that the predictors of
divorce can sometimes vary by the gender of the participant (Dew 2009; Sanchez and Gager 2000). This was
particularly true for the study that examined how assets
were associated with divorce (Dew 2009). Consequently, I
ran all of the analyses separately by gender so that I could
test whether the association between consumer debt and
divorce worked primarily through wives’ or husbands’
characteristics. Another statistical reason for running the
analyses separately by gender also existed. Because the
husbands and wives were clustered in couples, it was likely
that their errors would be correlated. Running them separately prevented the analyses from automatically violating
assumptions of uncorrelated errors.

Results
Table 2 shows the ability of consumer debt to predict the
mediator variables while controlling for assets, income,
and the other control covariates. For wives, consumer debt
was negatively associated with marital satisfaction (b =
-.04, p \ .001) and positively associated with financial
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Table 2 The association between W1 consumer debt and marital satisfaction, financial unfairness, and frequency of financial disagreements
(N = 4,574 wives and 4,574 husbands)
Wives

Husbands

Marital
satisfaction

Financial
disagreements

Financial
unfairness

b

b

B

StE

Intercept

6.53***

.15

.81***

.13

.16***

W1 Consumer debt

-.04***

.01

.07***

.01

.01

W1 Assets
W1 Income

StE

.03*

.01

-.05***

.01

-.04*

.02

-.01

.01

Marital
satisfaction
StE

-.02***
.01

Financial
disagreements

Financial
unfairness

b

b

b

StE

.05

6.32***

.14

.78***

.12

.09*

.04

.01

-.04**

.01

.07***

.01

.01***

.003

-.05***

.01

.01

.01

.004

-.01

.02

StE

.01

StE

.01

-.01

.01

.01

-.01

.01

W1 Age

-.003*

.002

-.02***

.001

.01

.01

-.01

.01

-.02***

.001

-.01

.01

W1 Number of marriages

-.03

.04

-.05

.03

.03**

.01

.04

.03

-.02

.03

-.01

.01

W1 Education

-.01

.01

-.01

.01

.01

-.01

.01

.01

.01

.01

.01

.02

-.06

Black

a

Other race/ethnic minoritya
W1 number of children in home
R2
a

-.17**

.07

.16*

.08

-.09***
.02

.02

.19**
-.17*
.07***
.10

.06
.07
.01

-.01
.05*
-.04
.02**
.02

.06

.06

.06

.01

.02

.03

.23**

.07

-.12

.07

-.02

.02

.01

-.09***
.02

.01

.07***
.13

.01

.01**
.01

.004

Omitted category is White, Non-Hispanic

* P \ .05. ** P \ .01. *** P \ .001

disagreements (b = .07, p \ .001). Consumer debt was not
associated with financial unfairness. Thus, financial
unfairness could not mediate the association between
consumer debt and divorce, for wives, but marital satisfaction and financial disagreements could.
Consumer debt was associated with all three of the
husbands’ mediators (Table 2). As expected, consumer
debt negatively predicted marital satisfaction (b = -.04,
p \ .01) and positively predicted financial disagreements
(b = .07, p \ .001) and financial unfairness (b = .01,
p \ .001). Thus, for husbands all three possible mediator
models remained intact.
The results from the wives’ proportional hazards models
are shown in Table 3. Every one point increase in the log
10 of consumer debt (e.g. a ten-fold increase in consumer
debt) was associated with a 7% increase in the likelihood of
divorce (p \ .05; Table 3, Model 1). Even though the
findings were statistically significant, on its face a 7%
increase in the likelihood of divorce does not seem to be a
very large increase. However, the magnitude of increase
for consumer debt is about the same as the magnitude of
decrease for each year of age—an important predictor of
divorce. Further, because this is a 7% increase in the
likelihood of divorce for each 10-fold increase in debt,
when couples have a high level of consumer debt, the
likelihood of divorce is multiplicatively increased. As in
previous findings (Dew 2009), assets were negatively
associated the hazard of divorce (b = -0.07, p \ .05) as
was age. African-Americans (b = .31, p \ .05) and those
in higher order marriages (b = .66, p \ .001) had a higher
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risk of divorce. Interestingly, income was not associated
with divorce in these models.
Table 3 also shows the results of the proportional hazards’ models after adding the mediator variables. Marital
satisfaction negatively predicted divorce (b = -.37,
p \ .001; Table 3, Model 2). When marital satisfaction
was in the model, the association between consumer debt
and divorce went to zero, suggesting full mediation.
Financial disagreements positively predicted divorce
(b = .24, p \ .01, Table 3, Model 3). Like marital satisfaction, when financial disagreements were added to the
model, consumer debt was not significant. Post-hoc Sobel
tests (not shown) suggested that both marital satisfaction
and financial disagreements could be considered possible
mediators of the association between consumer debt and
divorce.
In some ways, the husbands’ models were similar to the
wives’ models. Every 1 point increase in the log 10 of
consumer debt was associated with an 8% increase in
the hazard of divorce for husbands (p \ .05, Table 4,
Model 1). Again, although this may seem small, it exceeds
the magnitude of both age and education in terms of
predicting divorce. Further, the effect of consumer debt is
cumulative meaning that those with higher levels of debt
have a higher risk of divorce. Age (b = -.06, p \ .001),
number of marriages (b = .55, p \ .001), education
(b = -.05, p \ .01), and the categorical variable for
African-American (b = .30, p \ .05) were also associated
with the hazard of divorce. Income was not associated
with divorce.
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Table 3 The association between consumer debt, divorce, and possible mediating variables for wives (N = 4,574 wives)
Model 1

Model 2

B
W1 Consumer debt

StE

Log hazard

b

Model 3
StE

Log hazard

b

StE

Log hazard
1.05

.07*

.03

1.07

.05

.03

1.05

.05

.03

W1 Assets

-.07*

.03

.93

-.05

.03

.95

-.05

.03

.95

W1 Income

.01

.04

1.01

-.01

.04

1.01

.01

.04

1.01

-.37***b

.03

.69
.24***b

.03

1.27

W1 Marital satisfaction
W1 Financial disagreements
W1 Age

-.07***

.01

.93

-.08***

.01

.92

-.07***

.01

.93

W1 Number of marriages
W1 Education

.66***
-.03

.07
.02

1.93
.98

.66***
-.03

.07
.02

1.93
.97

.69***
-.02

.07
.02

1.99
.98

.31*

1.30

Blacka
Other race/ethnic minoritya
W1 Number of children in home

.14

1.36

.23

.14

1.26

.26

.14

-.15

.18

.86

-.07

.18

.92

-.06

.18

.94

.01

.04

1.01

-.02

.04

1.02

-.01

.04

.99

Note: The models were all adjusted for left-truncation by using marital duration at W1
a

Omitted category is White, Non-Hispanic.

b

Post-hoc Sobel tests significant at p \ .05 or better

* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001

Table 4 The association between consumer debt, divorce, and possible mediating variables for husbands (N = 4,574 husbands)
Model 1
B
W1 Consumer debt

.08*

Model 2
StE

Log
Hazard

b

.03

1.08

.06*

Model 3
StE
.03

Log
Hazard

b

1.06

.05

Model 4
StE

Log
Hazard

b

.03

1.05

.07*

StE

Log
Hazard

.03

1.07

W1 Assets

-.09**

.03

.91

-.08**

.03

.92

-.07*

.03

.93

-.09**

.03

.91

W1 Income

.01

.04

.99

.03

.04

1.02

.01

.04

.99

.01

.04

1.01

-7.97**

2.71

3.01**

1.06

.20***b

.03

1.22
.43*** .09

1.54

W1 Marital satisfaction
W1 martial satisfaction *
time

.0003
20.29

W1 financial conflict
W1 financial unfairness
W1 Age
W1 Number of marriages
W1 Education
Blacka
Other race/ethnic
minoritya
W1 Number of children
in home

-.06***

.01

.94

-.06***

.01

.94

-.06***

.01

.94

-.06*** .01

.94

.55***

.07

1.73

.59***

.07

1.80

.55***

.07

1.73

.56*** .07

1.75

-.05**

.02

.95

-.05**

.01

.95

-.04*

.02

.96

-.05**

.02

.95

.30*

.13

1.35

.27*

.13

1.30

.29*

.13

1.32

.28*

.13

1.32

-.27

.18

.76

-.16

.18

.85

-.22

.18

.80

-.25

.18

.78

.04

.03

1.04

.01

.04

1.01

.02

.04

1.02

.03

.04

1.03

Note: The models were all adjusted for left-truncation by using marital duration at W1
a

Omitted category is White, Non-Hispanic.

b

Post-hoc Sobel test significant at p \ .05. * p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001

Husbands’ marital satisfaction negatively predicted
divorce (b = -7.97, p \ .001, Table 4, Model 2), but,
unlike wives, a time by marital satisfaction interaction was
significant. The negative magnitude of marital satisfaction
was strong, but it quickly attenuated over time because the
marital satisfaction by time interaction was statistically
significant and highly positive (b = 3.01 p \ .01). That is,

marital satisfaction was initially negatively associated with
divorce, but it did not remain protective over time.
Although the coefficient for consumer debt declined when
marital satisfaction was in the model, it remained a significant predictor of the hazard of divorce. At best, marital
satisfaction was a partial mediator between consumer debt
and divorce that did not last long for husbands.
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Financial disagreements positively predicted the hazard
of divorce as expected (b = .20, p \ .001; Table 4, Model
3). Further, adding financial disagreements to the model
completely mediated the association between consumer
debt and the hazard of divorce. A post-hoc Sobel test (not
shown) indicated that financial disagreements were plausible mediators of the relationship between consumer debt
and divorce.
The final mediator in the husbands’ models, financial
unfairness, was positively associated with divorce
(b = .42, p \ .001; Table 4, Model 3). However, it only
partially reduced the relationship between consumer debt
and divorce. The coefficient for consumer debt went from
.08 to .07 and remained significant. Like marital satisfaction, it was only a partial mediator at best.
Table 5 shows results of Cox regressions with all of the
plausible mediator variables mediator variables (e.g., they
were predicted by consumer debt). For wives, marital satisfaction remained a strong predictor of divorce, while the
financial conflict coefficient declined by over half. For
husbands, financial unfairness no longer predicted the
hazard of divorce once marital satisfaction and financial
conflict were added to the model. The coefficient for
financial conflict decreased measurably whereas marital
satisfaction remained strong.

Discussion
This study examined whether unsecured consumer debt
was associated with the likelihood of divorce. The results

from proportional hazards models using a nationallyrepresentative sample of married participants indicated that
consumer debt positively predicted the hazard of divorce.
Specifically, every 1 unit increase in consumer debt (on a
log base 10 scale) was associated with a 7–8% increase in
the likelihood of divorce. Thus, the more debt participants
had, the higher their hazard of divorce. Because consumer
debt did not interact with time to predict divorce, this
indicated a 7–8% increase in the hazard of divorce at each
month in the data. By way of contrast, financial assets were
negatively associated with divorce as previous studies have
shown (Dew 2009).
An association between consumer debt and divorce
conflicts with a previous study that used the same data set
(Sanchez and Gager 2000), which found no association. A
few methodological differences between this study and
Sanchez and Gager (2000) exist. This study used a wider
group of married couples than the Sanchez and Gager (2000)
study used. Sensitivity analyses (not shown) suggest that this
did not lead to the differences, however, because the findings
remained unchanged when I restricted the data to couples
between the ages of 21 and 62. Further, controlling for
number of marriages did not alter the findings. Another
difference was that this study used a continuous-time event
history analysis using months as the unit of analysis rather
than a discrete-time event history analysis using years as the
unit of analysis like Sanchez and Gager (2000). Because the
two waves of the NSFH were only three to 5 years apart for
survey respondents, using years as the unit of analysis may
not have provided enough variance between divorcing
couples for an association between consumer debt and

Table 5 The association between consumer debt, divorce, and all potential mediating variables for husbands and wives (N = 4,574 couples)
Wives
B
W1 consumer debt

Husbands
StE

Log Hazard

b

StE

Log Hazard

.04

.03

1.04

.05

.03

W1 Assets

-.04

.03

.96

-.07**

.03

.93

W1 Income

-.01

.04

.99

.03

.04

1.02

W1 Marital satisfaction

-.34***

.71

-8.12**

2.78

W1 Martial satisfaction * time

–

3.08**

1.09

21.76

1.12

.13**

.04

1.14

–

.20

.11

1.22

-.06***

.01

.94

.59***

W1 Financial conflict

.03
–

.11**

W1 Financial unfairness

–

W1 Age

-.08***

W1 Number of marriages

–
.03

–
.67***

.01

.92

1.05

.0003

.07

1.95

.07

1.80

W1 Education
Blacka

-.02
.20

.02
.14

.98
1.22

-.05*
.23

.02
.14

.95
1.26

Other race/ethnic minoritya

-.05

.18

.95

-.14

.18

.87

W1 Number of children in home

-.02

.04

.98

-.01

.03

1.01

Note: The models were all adjusted for left-truncation by using marital duration at W1
a

Omitted category is White, Non-Hispanic

* P \ .05, ** P \ .01, *** P \ .001
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divorce to emerge. This more fine-grained analysis suggests
that such a relationship exists, though this finding needs to be
replicated, ideally, with more recent data (see below).
Income was not associated with divorce in this sample.4
This is striking given the fact that divorce trends have split
across income lines. That is, over the past two decades,
divorce rates have become lower among middle- and
upper-income families than among low-income couples
(Martin 2004). It may be that assets and debt are better
indicators of socioeconomic status than income. The lack
of findings for income may also support the idea often
found in popular family finance books that income is not
the biggest problem for families, but rather it is what
families do with their income that makes the difference
(Poduska 1995).
I also examined potential mediators of the association
between consumer debt and divorce. The mediating
mechanisms were somewhat different for wives and husbands. First, consumer debt was negatively associated with
both husbands’ and wives’ marital satisfaction. Marital
satisfaction was also negatively associated with divorce.
For wives the mediating effect of marital satisfaction was
total whereas for husbands, the mediating effect was only
partial. Further, a positive time by marital satisfaction
interaction suggested that the negative association between
marital satisfaction and divorce attenuated over time for
husbands. Thus, wives with less consumer debt were more
satisfied with their marriage and were less likely to divorce.
The finding that marital satisfaction completely mediated the association between consumer debt and divorce for
wives supports the idea from social exchange theory that
consumer debt would violate wives relationship expectations and make it more likely that they would leave the
union. That is, social exchange theory asserts that marital
dissatisfaction occurs when individuals fail to meet their
relationship expectations. If consumer debt were unrelated
to wives relationship expectations then it should not have
been associated with their satisfaction. The findings,
though, indicated that the more consumer debt couples had,
the less happy wives were in their marriage.
A number of ways exist whereby consumer debt might
make it harder for wives to meet their relationship expectations. Wives may simply expect that they will be financially secure in their marriage. This is certainly consistent

4

I conducted two additional sensitivity analysis regarding income
(not shown). First, I used a dummy variable to represent being in the
lowest income quartile (0 = income above the lowest quartile,
1 = income in the lowest quartile). This dummy variable was not a
significant predictor of divorce in the models. I also tried using 3
dummy variables to represent the 3 lowest income quartiles. Relative
to the highest income quartile, none of the other 3 groups had higher
hazards of divorce.
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with contemporary marriage norms that assert that individuals should be financially stable prior to marriage
(Cherlin 2004; Whitehead and Popenoe 2001). Consumer
debt might make it harder for individuals to feel financially
stable (Dew 2007; Conger et al. 1993). Consequently, if they
don’t feel financially secure, wives may become dissatisfied
with their relationship and even end the marriage.
Alternatively, consumer debt may be negatively associated with marital satisfaction if it interferes with meeting
relationship expectations beyond financial security. Consumer debt may influence non-financial dimensions of
family life—such as time use or work and employment—
and these changes may make it more difficult for them to
meet their relationship expectations in these areas. For
example, prior research showed that among newlyweds
increasing consumer debt was associated with a decline in
spending time together (Dew 2008). I could not test these
ideas with the data, unfortunately, so the exact reason that
consumer debt relates to marital dissatisfaction awaits
future research.
Second, consumer debt was positively associated with
husbands’ and wives’ reports of financial disagreements
which were positively associated with the likelihood of
divorce. Financial disagreements totally mediated the
association for both husbands and wives. As consumer debt
levels rose, participants reported more frequent financial
disagreements, on average. Under social exchange theory,
disagreements or conflict are relationship costs that make it
more difficult for couples to meet their relationship
expectations.
The question that remains, though, is what links consumer debt and financial disagreements. It may be that
decisions about consumer debt were not made jointly. In
other words, if one spouse made the decision to assume
debt on their own, this may have sparked disagreements.
Alternatively, consumer debt commits unearned resources
to future payments. This limits future budget flexibility
which may then be associated with more frequent financial disagreements. That is, if couples have less discretionary income because they are making payments toward
their consumer debt, they may have more frequent
arguments about the discretionary income that they do
have. The link between consumer debt and relationship
conflict is a question that is certainly worthy of future
research.
Perceptions of financial unfairness to oneself were not a
mediating factor in the relationship between consumer debt
and divorce, contrary to what I had hypothesized. Surprisingly, consumer debt was not even associated with
wives’ perceived financial unfairness. Although consumer
debt was positively related to feelings of financial unfairness for husbands, it did not mediate much of the relationship between consumer debt and divorce.
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These null findings contradict previous studies somewhat. As noted above when a spouse handles the money
foolishly or overspends, marital satisfaction and stability
suffer (Amato and Rogers 1997; Britt et al. 2008). It may
be that perceived financial unfairness is a different enough
construct from feelings about how a spouse handles the
money and thus it did not behave the same way. Alternatively, the variance in perceived financial unfairness was
somewhat restricted—most respondents reported no
financial unfairness to themselves—and that might have
been a problem in the analysis.
Another hypothesized finding that failed to fully materialize was that the mediators would be stronger for wives
than for husbands or that they would only work through
wives’ characteristics. Marital satisfaction did fully mediate the association between consumer debt and divorce for
only wives, but financial conflict was a full mediator for
both husbands and wives. Thus measures of assets and debt
may only relate to divorce through wives’ marital satisfaction (Dew 2009), but debt is associated with higher
levels of financial conflict (and also divorce) for both wives
and husbands (Dew 2007). The relationship of financial
issues with gender and marital processes and outcomes is
still a relatively underexamined question.
These findings are subject to the data limitations. First,
these findings need to be replicated with newer data (the
second wave of the NSFH took place between 1992 and
1994). On the one hand, this study preceded the ‘‘democratization of credit’’ that occurred during the mid to late
1990s. During the 1990s, credit card companies relaxed
their qualification standards and offered credit to individuals who were at higher risk of default. Thus, with more
individuals having credit card debt (and more of those
individuals at risk of default) the association between credit
card debt and divorce might be higher now. On the other
hand, a recession took place between W1 and W2 of the
NSFH. This might have strengthened the association
between consumer credit and divorce because those who
went into the 1991 recession with higher levels of consumer debt might have experienced greater economic
pressure. Thus, consumer debt may not be associated with
divorce during period of economic growth—though future
research would need to examine this question. At any rate,
the finding that assets and debt are associated with divorce
likelihood need to be replicated with more recent data.
Another limitation was a lack of detail on who decided
to assume what debt and who initiated the divorce.
Although in some couples the spouses might have jointly
decided to assume consumer debt, in other couples one
spouse might have decided to assume debt without the
input of their spouse. These same ideas hold for divorce. In
some cases it was likely a joint decision and in other cases
it might have been a unilateral decision. Knowing the
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dynamics behind these two decisions could have clarified
the link between consumer debt and divorce. Unfortunately
the NSFH did not contain this information.
Finally, this study cannot rule out the possibility of the
association between consumer debt and divorce being due
to endogeneity or unobserved characteristics. After statistically adjusting for endogeneity, for example, the association between bankruptcy and divorce was not significant
in another study (Fisher and Lyons 2006). An example of
an unobserved characteristic that was not in this data set,
but that might play a role in the association between consumer debt and divorce is irresponsibility. Individuals who
are irresponsible with their finances may also be less
responsible in their relationships and consequently fail to
nurture the marriage. Alternatively, consumer debt may
simply be a proxy for medical debt, another construct not
measured in the data.5 It may be that medical debt, and its
attendant problems like bankruptcy, are so crushing that
they disrupt marriages. Because survey designs cannot
measure all variables, this is a limitation that prevents this
study from asserting a causal relationship between consumer debt and the likelihood of divorce.
Although this study does have limitations, the accumulating weight of evidence in this emerging field is slowly
becoming clear. Financial behaviors that 50 years ago
might have been characterized as ‘‘thrifty’’ or ‘‘wasteful’’
have implications for married couples that go beyond their
financial bottom lines. These behaviors and the financial
distress or well being that they create influence couples’
relationship processes, their relationship happiness, and
ultimately their relationship stability. When couples perform sound financial management behaviors, e.g., when
they accumulate assets and pay down debt, they report that
their relationships are happier, that they have less conflict,
and they are ultimately less likely to divorce. Consequently, in addition to the obvious financial reasons to
practice thrift, married couples also have relationship reasons to do so.
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